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Malawi is popularly regarded as a paradigm of African capitalism, having pursued an
export-orientated, agriculturally-based development strategy in accordance with the dictates of
international comparative advantage. Until the late 1970s, when the economy was derailed by
exogenous shocks and poor policy response, the reward was almost two decades of rapid
economic growth. Madagascar is often cited as an example of failed African socialism.
Capital-intensive import-substituting industrialisation, nationalisation, a distorted incentive
regime and over-extension of the state's economic apparatus contributed to three decades of
declining per capita income in the post-independence period. Also by way of contrast, Malawi
has pursued over a decade of largely uninterrupted stabilisation and structural adjustment
programmes under the auspices of the IMF and World Bank, whilst Madagascar has been slow
to respond to the macro-economic crisis facing many low-income LDCs in the 1980s.
Frederic Pryor's comparative study of these two countries, which is one in a series of nine
World Bank comparative studies in political economy', offers the first full-length analytic
economic history of Malawi and Madagascar's post-independence period. In addition, it
provides a rigorous and comprehensive update of economic statistics, many of which have been
considerably reworked to improve accuracy. The scope of Pryor's work is extensive and
focuses on three questions: what economic policies did the two nations follow? Why did they
adopt different policies? How did these policies influence economic growth and income
distribution? Five clear lessons, of relevance to growth strategies and prospects in low-income
sub-Saharan countries, emerge from this questioning:
i) The misleading nature of ideological terms such as "market capitalism" and
"socialism" when analysing the role of the state and the market in an African context.
1 The series, edited by Deepak Lai and Hla Myint, also includes Egypt and Turkey, Sri Lanka and Malaysia, Indonesia
and Nigeria, Thailand and Ghana, Brazil and Mexico, Costa Rica and Uruguay, Columbia and Peru, and five small
economies (Hong Kong, Singapore, Malta, Jamaica and Mauritius). Many of the series volumes will be published by
Oxford University Press. A volume of special studies on related topics, edited by George Psacharopoulos, will also
be published.
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ii) The importance of both the quality and quantity of public sector investment.
iii) The need for appropriate market-based incentive regimes backed by adequate
government investment and institutional support for the market.
iv) The need for consistency, continuity and administrative realism in the framing of
policy objectives, combined with a degree of automatic equilibrating flexibility in
specific policy instruments.
v) The fact that the choice of a particular broad type of growth strategy (e.g. inward or
outward looking, labour or capital intensive, rural or urban biased) does not guarantee
that growth will be accompanied by poverty alleviation and improved income
distribution.
Sahn et al's work illustrates the relevance of the above lessons in the context of Malawi's
stabilisation and structural adjustment programmes undertaken during the 1980s. In many
respects, the above five points suggest a mid-ground position on the role of the state and the
market in African economies. Since this position reflects broader trends in many current
policy-making and academic circles, it is worth exploring each of the five themes in more
detail in the context of Pryor's comparative work.
Pryor's data shows that by most conventional indicators - public ownership, public sector
employment, and the shares of public sector expenditure and investment in total GDP (Table
1-2), the role of the state was more important in the Malawian than the Malagasy economy.
In addition, "'Capitalist' Malawi accomplished an unmet goal of most socialist nations -
making state-owned farms profitable." (p. 83). In other sectors of the Malawian economy -
industry, marketing, retail, finance, transportation - most parastatals also made profits, which
were efficiently reinvested, through to the late 1970s: "The reinvestment by the publicly-owned
enterprises shows in still another way that "capitalist" Malawi has achieved a means of
expansion of the public sector unrealised in most of the socialist African nations." (p. 150).
Hence, parastatal sector made an important contribution to Malawi's healthy growth rate during
the 1960s and 1970s.
The progressive leftward shift of Madagascar's three political regimes (the 1960-72
government of Philibert Tsiranana, the 1972-5 government of General Gabriel Ramanantsoa,
and the government of Didier Ratsiraka) culminated in extensive nationalisations, a state-led,
heavy industry import-substitution programme, experiments with agricultural cooperatives, and
a strong urban bias in the overall policy regime. Pryor details how Madagascar's state
expansion set in motion a vicious downward economic cycle which lasted from 1972 to the
late 1980s. GDP growth stagnated, agricultural and manufacturing output fell, the volume of
exports decreased at an average annual rate of 3.8%, and the enlarged parastatal sector incurred
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large losses, "In contrast to Malawi, the parastatal sector in Madagascar has been a sink for,
not a source of, savings" (p. 228).
Pryor's comparative survey clearly shows that use of the "capitalist", and "socialist" labels
to indicate the level of state economic activity can be misleading. More importantly it
challenges, the oft-made assumption that the level of state activity will be negatively correlated
with economic performance. It is the nature, quality and objectives of public sector economic
activity, rather than its extent, which is of relevance. It is in this respect that Pryor shows
ideology to have been important in shaping the Malawian and Malagasy economic experience,
"The official ideologies of Malawi and Madagascar have, however, strongly influenced... the
goals of economic development and the means selected to achieve such goals" (p. 9). Pryor
argues that the function of the Malawian public sector was to support and, in many respects,
to lead, an agriculturally-based, export-orientated, labour-intensive development strategy. To
this end parastatals were run according to a "capitalist" mandate of profit maximisation. Their
developmental functions were minimal and this enabled them to earn a re-investible surplus
or, more controversially in the case of the agricultural state marketing board, ADMARC, to
extract surplus from smallholder producers and reinvest in other economic sectors, including
the estate agricultural sub-sector.
It is in the assessment of the state's role in extracting surplus from smallholder producers,
and more generally, in creating considerable agricultural intra-sectoral bias in favour of the
estates, that Pryor's work on Malawi is most provocative. Pryor suggests, contrary to received
opinion, (Kydd and Christiansen (1981)), that this "wager-on-the-strong" strategy did not
significantly worsen overall income distribution, but rather that "the hiring of workers from the
smallholdings serves to narrow nationwide income differentials" (p. 89). In addition, it is also
asserted, although in this case with less supporting evidence, that the estate's favourable access
to land labour and credit did not harm the smallholder sector as much as was previously
believed (ibid.) and that "if resources had not flowed to the estate sector, Malawi's overall
growth would have been slower" (p. 91).
In contrast to Malawi's capitalist brand of state intervention the state in Madagascar served
as an instrument in a nationalistic, inward-looking, urban-based development strategy which
during the Ratsiraka period explicitly shunned price and profit incentives. An important lesson
which can be extracted from Pryor's broad historical survey is that the hackneyed dichotomy
"the state versus the market" is of little assistance in explaining the kind of diversity in strategy
and outcome as witnessed in Malawi and Madagascar.2 In view of this, African governments
currently undertaking market-based structural adjustment reforms, should perhaps focus not $p
much on a rolling-back of the state as on a reorientation of state economic activity with a
greater focus on supporting rather than supplanting the market system.
2 A similar message emerges from Robert Wade's recently published study of the quantity and quality of state
involvement in South East Asia's industrial and economic success. R. Wade (1991) Governing the Market, Princeton
University Press.
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The comparative study of Malawi and Madagascar indicates the importance of investment,
particularly public sector investment, in the growth process of low-income countries with
fragmented markets and large, atomistic, ecologically fragile agricultural sectors. The most
striking feature of Malawi's post-independence economic performance was the rapid
mobilisation of both domestic and foreign resources which were used to carry out an extensive
state-led investment programme. Much of the credit for this impressive savings and investment
record lies with the public sector, which made extensive efforts to increase government
savings. In addition to the re-investible surplus of the parastatal sector, a remarkable fiscal
effort increased tax revenue from 7% of GDP in 1964 to 19% in 1985. Pryor's data suggests
that this was achieved whilst also maintaining a mildly progressive tax system.
In contrast, "Madagascar has not been very successful in mobilising either internal or
external resources for investment. As a result its domestic savings and investment rates have
been relatively low" (p. 225). The government's open hostility to foreign capital discouraged
external resource mobilisation, economic stagnation made it difficult to increase tax revenues,
and excessive price distortions and mismanagement prevented the accumulation of surplus
within the parastatal sector. Madagascar's gross national savings to GDP ratio stood at only
9.3 % in the mid-1980s - barely up from the 7.2% of 1968; whilst the ratio of gross investment
to GDP stood at 13.8% in 1986 - the same share as in 1966.
Pryor clearly believes that Malawi's ability to implement a state-led investment strategy,
in contrast to Madagascar's disappointing resource mobilisation effort, is a crucial explanatory
factor in the sharply contrasting growth and export performance of the two countries. Direct
and indirect investment by the public sector in Malawi accounted for between two-thirds and
three-quarters of all post-independence investment. Much of this investment, particularly in
the 1960s and early 1970s, was in productive sectors and infrastructure projects which
generated positive externalities for the nation as a whole, and as such required a state-led
investment strategy. Pryor's emphasis on the importance of public sector investment is
refreshing following a decade when many policy makers and donors in Africa focused heavily
on markets and prices whilst down-playing the relevance of public sector investment in
generating a supply-side response (World Bank (1981)).
Pryor is careful to stress that the key difference between the two countries was not only
in the quantity but also in the quality of their public sector investment. Malawi's investment
gave priority to transport, communications and agriculture. The overall productivity of
investment was higher than in many other African nations, including Madagascar, with
Malawi's ICOR for the 1954-1986 period averaging 4.0 compared to 7.9 in Madagascar. The
changing pattern of Malawi's public sector investment programme from the late 1970s, when
the government launched a series of capital-intensive prestige projects, also helps to explain
Malawi's declining ICOR during the early 1980s. The importance of the quality of public
sector investment is best illustrated by Pryor's analysis of Madagascar's "invest-to-the-hilt"
campaign which commenced in 1978 and led to a doubling of investment, largely financed by
short-term government borrowing abroad. The invest-to-the-hilt policy, unlike Malawi's state-
led investment strategy, focused on large, capital-intensive, urban-orientated industrial projects,
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most of which were "ill-chosen and had little impact on production" (p. 225) and were
inappropriate to the country's "comparative advantage, factor proportions, or the administrative
abilities of the government" (p. 229). In addition to inflationary and balance of payments
pressures, the invest-to-the-hilt campaign contributed to an alarming increase in Madagascar's
ICOR which reached 55 in the early 1980s. The contrasting outcomes of Malawi and
Madagascar's very different types of state-led investment strategies illustrate the immense
difficulties and potentially "catastrophic results" of attempting to pursue a state-led teleological
investment strategy designed to reshape comparative advantage in favour of the industrial
sector, within the context of limited public sector administrative capacity and in the face of a
considerably more hostile external environment than faced by the South East Asian newly
industrialised countries during their transition period.
Pryor's work draws attention to the importance of market-based incentive structures in the
development process. Not only was Malawi's parastatal sector characterised by a capitalist,
profit-maximising, individualistic philosophy; the overall level of price distortion was also
relatively low. In particular, the avoidance of the anti-agricultural bias of an over-valued
exchange rate, at least until the 1980s, was in marked contrast to Madagascar. In this respect,
Pryor seems to ascribe the success of Malawi's estate-led growth more to the "provision of
high personal economic incentives to produce" (p. 92) than to a plundering of resources from
the smallholder sub-sector. Unlike Malawi, Madagascar progressively moved away from a
market-based incentive regime and by the mid-1970s was implementing plans based on the
belief that "productivity would be enhanced, not by closer attention to economic incentives,
but by education and a change in the attitudes and behaviour of workers and managers, whose
efforts would be channelled through a new type of participatory administrative system" (p.
235). This supplanting, as opposed to supporting, of the market system by the state, in
conjunction with an over-valued exchange rate and a deterioration in the rural sector's terms
of trade, led to a collapse in production and exports, particularly within the agricultural sector.
Pryor provides ample evidence with which to chart the correlation between the Madagascar
government's increasing distrust of material incentives and deterioration in sectoral and
macroeconomic performance.
Comparison of Malawi and Madagascar's planning styles and use of macro-economic
policy instruments illustrates the importance of realism in macro-planning, in terms of both the
country's administrative and physical resource base, and the need for flexible policy
instruments which can provide equilibrating mechanisms at the macro level.
Pryor suggests that Malawi's realistic policy goals in the post-independence period can
largely be attributed to the pessimism generated by the considerable economic difficulties faced
at independence. Consequently, the country's strong and surprising economic performance in
the late 1960s and early 1970s helped to consolidate the political legitimacy of life president
Banda's regime and enabled the emergence of a strong state which could lead the development
process. Madagascar, on the other hand, with extremely high nationalistic hopes of rapid
improvements in economic performance at the time of independence, found itself unable to
fulfil these expectations, despite the fact that growth performance in the first post-independence
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decade was similar to that in Malawi. Unfulfilled expectations created political legitimacy
problems which led to an increasing temptation to follow ever more ambitious and unrealistic
"gamble-for-growth" strategies, culminating in the 1978 invest-to-the-hilt campaign. Pryor
provides a sophisticated analysis of the manner in which such political and economic factors
interacted to create virtuous (Malawi) and vicious (Madagascar) circles of cumulative
causation.
The assessment of each country's overall policy framework and goals is supplemented by
an analysis of individual macro-policy instruments. A major part of Pryor's thesis is that, in
addition to differing public sector investment performance, differing flexibility and
responsiveness of macro-policy instruments explains much of the contrast in the two countries'
economic performance.
Pryor provides considerable detail regarding the flexibility of Malawi's macro-policy
instruments in response to exogenous shocks, and the manner in which such flexibility
deteriorated in the early 1980s when policy-makers introduced a range of new instruments
which over-rode the previously equilibrating mechanisms. In particular, Malawi's trade
regime, apart from the aberration in the 1983-87 period, "has permitted an adjustment to the
declining terms of trade by discouraging imports and encouraging exports, the type of
adjustment a functioning market economy would make in such circumstances to bring its
balance of payments into equilibrium" (p. 132). Likewise exchange rate and monetary policy
instruments are shown to have "permitted automatic mechanisms to influence some operations
of both the private and the parastatal sectors" (p. 137).
Madagascar's trade, monetary, exchange rate, and fiscal policy instruments lacked the
Malawian equilibrating mechanisms and Pryor illustrates how "Madagascar's heavy reliance
on quantitative trade restrictions to equilibrate the balance of payments left little scope for
other equilibrating mechanisms to operate" (p. 300). During periods of balance of payments
pressure, the shift in the relative price of tradables and non-tradables was much smaller than
in Malawi, such that Madagascar was unable to "produce its way out of the crisis".
Consequently, despite roughly similar current account deficits in the early 1980s, "the
imbalance in Madagascar caused more severe dislocations throughout the economy because of
its heavier reliance on administrative controls" (p. 131).
The lesson which again emerges from this part of Pryor's work is that it is not the number
and extent of government interventionist policy instruments, but rather their quality, in terms
of equilibrating capacity and the realism of their targeted goals, which is of relevance in
determining economic performance. Differences on this score help to explain why the
Malawian economy out-performed the Malagasy economy even though the latter faced a
considerably more favourable external environment throughout much of the period.
Despite the title of Pryor's work, his findings are more conclusive regarding the political
economy of growth than that of poverty and equity. Undoubtedly this has much to do with
the paucity and quality of income data. One clear result, however, does emerge, namely, that
the pursuit of a labour-intensive agrarian-based development strategy does not guarantee
improved income distribution and poverty alleviation. Pryor's analysis and reworking of
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Malawian data indicates that both income differences and poverty have increased since
independence. Although the agrarian-based strategy and the avoidance of urban-bias helped
to reduce income differentials between Malawi's urban and rural sectors, income inequalities
within both sectors widened. In particular, deteriorating income distribution within the
agricultural sector contributed to the overall increase in income inequalities. In contrast to
previous observers (Kydd and Christiansen, 1981) Pryor suggests that this was largely due to
declining smallholder holding size caused by population increase and to the government's
inability to implement a successful rural development programme to increase smallholder
productivity, rather than to the intra-sectoral bias in favour of the estates: "These policy
problems, combined with a decline in average farm size, have prevented escape from
diminishing returns, which seem to be the most important factor underlying the apparent
decline in the real income of the families at the bottom 40 prevent of the income distribution"
(p.92). Indeed, Pryor goes so far as to suggest that excessive emphasis on the intra-sectoral
estate bias has distracted attention from the root causes of Malawi's worsening rural income
distribution. Policy conditions to reduce the pro-estate bias which have been attached to the
World Bank's 1988 Agricultural Sectoral Adjustment Credit to Malawi suggests a contrary
view within Bank circles. The distributional effects of Madagascar's development also
cautions against the linking of broad types of strategy to certain distributional outcomes.
Despite the urban and industrial bias of Madagascar's development policies, the urban-rural
income differential narrowed as in Malawi, whilst income distribution also similarly worsened
within both sectors,. Pryor is careful to stress that the causes of widening intra-sectoral, and
hence overall, income inequality were very different in each country, and were related to the
specific manner in which each countries' general development strategy was pursued.
The two countries also differed in that Madagascar's socialist ideology in the post-1972
period placed a greater emphasis on the state's role in providing social services and other
forms of intervention to improve the distribution of real wage income. Yet Pryor's data
suggest that although Madagascar may have had a greater overall equality of income, poverty
"appears to be much the same in the two countries" (p.367), and "inequalities within the rural
sector of Madagascar appear to be greater than those in Malawi" (p.364). Neither was
Madagascar able to avoid intensification of inequality and poverty. Pryor's implicit conclusion
from this appears to be that low-income Sub-Saharan countries have limited ability to directly
address income distribution and poverty through the government budget, and hence should
adopt Malawi's "particular type of basic needs orientation" under which the "major thrust of
policy has been towards raising incomes, rather than redistributing income through government
expenditures on education, health, and welfare" (p. 180). The failure of Malawi's growth to
trickle-down, as clearly shown by Pryor's own evidence, Pryor's controversial view that
Malawi's estate-led growth strategy was not a prime cause of worsening inequality and
poverty, and the fact that the Malagasy direct public sector basic needs strategy was
implemented within the context of declining GDP per capita, macro-economic disequilibria,
and excessive urban bias (yet was not itself a primary cause of this macro-economic
deterioration) is a weak comparative basis from which to make such a judgement. Fortunately,
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it is the only instance, in an otherwise rigorous book, in which a strong policy conclusion is
derived from a somewhat slender empirical foundation.
The five general types of policy issues which are analyzed in Pryor's comparative study
and summarised above, provide important policy lessons, which although simple, are pertinent.
They reflect a broader trend, in both academic (J. Toye (1987), T. Killick (1989)) and policy-
making (World Bank (1990)) circles, towards a re-taking of the middle ground in the
previously dichotomised debates concerning the state versus the market; public investment
versus private incentives, national plans versus policy responsiveness and growth versus equity.
Michael Lipton's (1987) attack on the "pricist and state-minimalist" tendencies within the
development counter-revolution coherently argued that price adjustments in the face of an
excessive rolling back of the state's support for the agricultural sector are unlikely to elicit
much by way of an increase in productivity and aggregate output. The influence of the pricist
state minimalist school on many of the World Bank's early adjustment programmes and the
disappointing agricultural response to such programmes in Sub-Saharan Africa (P. Mosley and
L. Smith (1989)) means that Lipton's mid-ground position on the state and the market in
Africa is rapidly becoming conventional wisdom. More recently, the Bank itself (World Bank
(1990)) has expressed alarm at the growing evidence (P. Mosley, J. Harrigan and J. Toye
(1991)) that stabilisation and adjustment programmes are often associated with cuts public
sector investment. The cuts often appear to be indiscriminate as between quality and low
productivity public sector investments. Again, the concern is that such an investment decline
in the low income African economies is inimical to the success of the supply-side response
required for adjustment with sustainable growth. The failure of private investment to fill the
gap left by the cut in public sector capital formation lends support to structuralist arguments
(L. Taylor (1988)) that for many African countries the "crowding-out" concept may be
misplaced, with public and private investment functioning as a complements rather than
substitutes.3 Pryor's comparative historical analysis of the role of state-led investment in both
Malawi and Madagascar lends historical weight to this emerging mid-ground position which
emphasises the importance of public sector investment yet acknowledges the relevance of the
quality and type of such investment and its relationship to market mechanisms.
On the planning versus policy responsiveness front, the retreat towards the middle ground
is illustrated by the acknowledgement in both the IMF and Bank that some form of indicative
policy framework is required in order to ensure policy continuity, consistency and realism in
LDC macro-reform programmes. Hence the use of tripartite (Government, Bank, and Fund)
Policy Framework Papers in low-income countries from the mid-1980s onwards. At the same
3 Taylor cites as evidence for this complementarity or "crowding-in" view the case of the Cote d'lvoire, Egypt,
Turkey, Mexico and Argentina where reductions in public sector investment have been associated with a fall in private
investment (L. Taylor (1988), p. 85), and the case of Kenya and the Cote d'lvoire where stabilisation programmes,
including cuts in the public sector investment programme, have failed to stimulate the inflow of foreign private
investment (ibid., p. 51).
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time, Bank supported research work, (D. Bevan, P. Collier, and J. Gunning (1990)) has shown
the importance of the type of policy instruments employed within the policy framework,
namely, the growth-enhancing role of flexible instruments which enable the policy regime to
automatically respond with equilibrating mechanisms in the face of both positive and negative
exogenous shocks.4 Again, there are strong echoes here of Pryor's findings in the context of
his two country comparative study - government planning exercises and the overall policy
framework are important, yet equally so, the style of planning and the types of instruments
employed.
Finally, the growth-equity debate, re-launched by UNICEF's work in the mid-1980s (G.
Cornia, R. Jolly, and F. Stewart (1987)), is no longer characterised by the extremes of the
"trickle-down" view (which implicitly underlay the Bank's lack of concern with poverty related
issues in its early adjustment lending exercises) or the "growth requires worsening income
distribution" position derived from naive interpretations of the Lewis dual economy model.
It is now increasingly acknowledged that although growth may enhance, and itself be enhanced
by, poverty alleviation and improved income distribution, this is not guaranteed by the adoption
of a particular type of growth strategy in terms of trade-orientation, factor intensities, or
sectoral bias. This conclusion equally applies to IMF and World Bank growth strategies based
on rapid macro-economic stabilisation and market liberalisation. As a result, many policy
makers are now attempting to specifically incorporate welfare and distributional objectives as
an integral part of their policy framework instead of assuming that a particular type of general
growth strategy makes explicit concern for such issues either unnecessary or futile. Pryor's
analysis of two highly contrasting growth strategies lends support to this mid-ground position
on the growth-equity-poverty front.
The work by D. Sahn, J. Arulpragasam, and L. Merrid, Policy Reform and Poverty in
Malawi: A Survey of a Decade of Experience, illustrates the relevance of many of Pryor's
general policy conclusions within the context of the stabilisation and structural adjustment
programmes undertaken by Malawi during the 1980s. The stated objectives of their work is
to "examine the functioning and characteristics of the markets and institutions that will mediate
between macroeconomic and sectoral reform policies and their household and macroeconomic
effects" (p. xii). To this end the reader is provided with a detailed specification of five types
of vulnerable households: smallholders; wage labourers; tenant farmers; the urban poor; and
female-headed households. Reform programmes in five areas - agricultural pricing and
marketing, industrial and service sectors, external sector, monetary policy, and fiscal policy -
4 The importance of an equilibrating set of policy instruments is particularly relevant in the African economies which
remain heavily reliant on primary export commodities vulnerable to the vagaries of nature and international price
fluctuations. Adaptive policy instruments help to ensure that a transient windfall income gain derived from a positive
exogenous shock is translated into a permanent income gain whilst also ensuring that negative shocks do not result
in large permanent income losses leading to a permanent fall in consumption, investment and growth (D.L. Bevan,
P. Collier, and J.W. Gunning (1990)).
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are then assessed in terms of both their macro effects and their effects on the five identified
groups.
Although the book provides a plethora of data on welfare indicators for the five specified
household types, its conclusions are often tenuous regarding the links between policy and
household welfare effects. Most often, the reader is told that "the jury is still out" on such
questions. For example, on the key issue of the effects of agricultural reforms on the rural
poor, we are told that "The adjustment program does not appear to have made great inroads
either in terms of raising smallholder productivity or generating employment or higher wages.
Thus the jury is still out on both how to make agriculture more dynamic and whether doing
so will raise rural incomes" (pp.100-1). Likewise, "it is impossible now to clearly distinguish
the relative importance of endogenous and exogenous factors in contributing to Malawi's slow
rate of growth and low living standards" (p.216), or "understanding with any confidence how
various policies filter through the economy to affect marginal and vulnerable households,
however, awaits the results of further research" (p.218). It is in identifying required areas for
further research, providing extensive data on trends in household welfare indicators, and in
tracing the first link in the chain between macro reform and household welfare effects, namely
the link between reform and macroeconomic and sectoral level outcomes, that Sahn et al's
book contributes most to the current work on policy reform and poverty.
In identifying casual links between adjustment reforms and macro and sector level
economic outcomes Sahn et a/.'s work provides detailed support for many of Pryor's broader
conclusions. On the issue of the importance of state interventions, particularly in the form of
public sector investments, Sahn et al. clearly argue that lack of public sector institutional and
investment support to back the agricultural pricing and marketing reforms was an important
cause of the latter's disappointing outcome in terms of both growth and poverty alleviation
effects. Their data show that the use of pricing policy, namely increasing the producer price
of smallholder exportable cash crops, in an attempt to boost the smallholder contribution to the
balance of payments, failed to stimulate an aggregate increase in total smallholder output, "The
hypothesis that high own-price supply elasticities are largely the result of the reallocation of
agricultural resources among crops, rather than intensive or extensive agricultural growth, finds
substantial support" (p.89). It is shown that success in increasing the marketed output of
exportable cash crops was at the cost of declining food crop output with adverse macro-
economic and individual food security implications. Sahn et al's analysis of the overall reform
programme places much of the blame for this disappointing agricultural outcome on the
government's inability to provide adequate state support to the sector "the limited scope of
price-related adjustment initiatives in raising output and productivity, and consequently
incomes, indicates that they must be accompanied by measures to raise and improve public
inputs into the production process" (p.221). The need for a higher level of more effective
public sector investment in order to increase the elasticity of aggregate agricultural supply is
especially emphasised within the context of Malawi's land-constraint. Although this argument
is not new (J. Harrigan (1988)), Sahn et al. have amassed a considerable amount of additional
supporting data from a number of sources.
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Sahn et al.'s work also provides detailed support for another of the conclusions which
emerged from Pryor's work, namely, that relating to the importance of consistency in the
policy framework and equilibrating flexibility in policy instruments. Their assessment of the
macro effects of the adjustment programme indicates that the disappointing response prior to
1988 was partly due to the government's failure to consistently implement the programme
combined with increased recourse to destabilising policy instruments during periods of
increasing balance of payments pressure. For example, regarding agricultural pricing policies,
it is shown that although nominal producer prices increased between 1982-1985, real producer
prices continued to be upwardly sticky leading to the conclusion that "pricing policy rules, per
se, may not have undergone a lasting change during the past decade" (p.78). It is suggested
that this, and several other policy implementation problems, can be explained by the
government's failure in the early stages of the adjustment programme to devise a clear policy
framework which acknowledged trade-offs between dual policy objectives such as price
stability and border pricing, and food security and agricultural export earnings.
On the issue of flexible, equilibrating policy instruments, Sahn et al. show that by the mid-
1980s, in the face of a disappointing supply-side response and mounting balance of payments
pressures, Malawian authorities moved away from the use of policy instruments with built-in
equilibrating mechanisms towards the use of short-term crisis management instruments such
as quantitative restrictions on the allocation of foreign exchange. Failure, also, to maintain a
conservative monetary policy is shown to have had a destabilising effect, leading to rapid
inflation and appreciation of the real exchange rate. This macro analysis paints a picture of
a vicious cycle not dissimilar to Pryor's picture of Madagascar in the 1970s. The new types
of policy instruments employed by the Malawian authorities in the mid-1980s help to explain
Sahn et al.'s observation that "the shares of both agriculture and industry have lost ground to
the services sector, raising questions about the effectiveness of recent policy, or at least its
implementation" (p. 148). As with Madagascar in the 1970s, Malawi in the mid-1980s, having
lost faith in many of its earlier equilibrating policy instruments and lacking a clear and
consistent policy framework, was unable use expenditure switching techniques to "produce its
way out of the crisis".
A careful study of Sahn et al.'s work will provide the reader with many other examples
of the relevance of Pryor's lessons regarding the role of the state and the market, planning and
flexibility, and public investment and private incentives in the context of Malawi's structural
adjustment programme.
In one important respect, namely regarding the causes of income inequality and poverty in
Malawi, the conclusions of Sahn et al.'s work differ substantially from Pryor's. Pryor
maintains that it is increasing smallholder population pressure and the consequent decline in
holding size, rather than the pro-estate bias of Malawi's export-orientated growth strategy that
has been the prime cause of worsening income distribution and poverty within the rural sector.
In addition, for Pryor, the pro-estate strategy has provided an important source of
supplementary income-earning opportunities for smallholder families and hence, by implication,
estate success is seen to have stemmed the increase in rural income inequality and poverty.
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Sahn et al. argue the reverse. They provide convincing evidence to show that rural poverty
is not directly correlated with smallness of land holding size, as implied by Pryor's argument.
Their data also suggests that the lack of correlation between holding size and smallholder
family income is not predominantly due to earning opportunities on the estates - remittances,
transfers, and other sources of income from rural and urban informal sector activities are
shown to provide a more important income supplement than estate earnings (Table 7). Sahn
et al.'s argument, however, is even stronger. Their view is that smallholder families have been
forced to seek such non-farm income opportunities partly because the pro-estate dualistic
structure of Malawian agriculture has contributed to the increasing marginalisation of many
smallholder farms: "the poverty problem in Malawi particularly emanates from the dualistic
structure of the rural productive structure" (p.217).
Both Pryor's and Sahn et a/.'s work illustrate the complexities of rural poverty and
distributional issues in low-income agrarian economies and caution against excessive emphasis
on mono-causes such as pro-estate bias or land holding size. Unfortunately, however, a
reading of the two works leaves the reader feeling that the jury is indeed still out on the key
question, namely the extent to which Malawi's successful estate-led growth has contributed to
the alarming increase in the country's income inequality and poverty.
Jane Harrigan
University of Manchester
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Policy Choice and Development Performance in Botswana
Charles Harvey and Stephen R. Lewis
Botswana stands out in the developing world as a country that has made great progress
since Independence. Its diamond endowment has in general been well managed, and the
government has avoided many of the pitfalls of other major primary commodity exporters.
Policy Choice and Development Performance in Botswana documents these achievements
objectively and clearly. While discussing areas where policy has been well managed, the
authors do not fail to mention past limitations and problem areas as well as challenges
remaining for the future.
The book sets the stage for its discussion of policy by presenting the country's position at
Independence. Botswana's history says little for colonial rule and makes the achievements of
the last 25 years even more impressive. Given this, the authors present and analyze the
country's development strategies, macroeconomic management, and major sectoral policies.
Of primary importance to the country's overall success has been its management of diamond
export earnings. The government's control over spending, both recurrent and development,
and management of the exchange rate provide an unusual counter example to all of the case
studies of the "Dutch disease" effects of countries with booming primary commodity export
sectors.
The book's chapter on the manufacturing sector demonstrates one of the benefits of
successful macroeconomic management of diamond exports. Although manufacturing is a
small sector of the economy, large export earnings from diamonds have not crowded this sector
out or resulted in the Dutch disease's "de-industrialization". Instead, this sector has grown at
high rates and has successfully broken into export markets, essential if the sector is to
contribute to Botswana's future growth. This sector is extremely important for Botswana's
future, given its comparative disadvantage in agriculture and since the country cannot
reasonably expect continued new discoveries of minerals.
Developments in the manufacturing sector in Botswana are the result of activity in the
private sector, but within a conducive macroeconomic environment. As the authors make
clear, however, the country's overall success cannot be interpreted as an example of the
benefits of low or no government involvement in the economy. Instead, the government has
 at School of O
riental and A
frican Studies on February 19, 2015
http://jae.oxfordjournals.org/
D
ow
nloaded from
 
